Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Litigation

Research Projects and Empirical Data

1-1-2011

Florida v. HHS - Amicus Brief of Chamber of
Commerce
United States Chamber of Commerce

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca
Part of the Health Law Commons
Automated Citation
United States Chamber of Commerce, "Florida v. HHS - Amicus Brief of Chamber of Commerce" (2011). Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act Litigation. Paper 137.
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca/137

This Amicus Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Projects and Empirical Data at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

Nos. 11-11021-HH, 11-11067-HH
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
___________________________
STATE OF FLORIDA, by and through Pam Bondi Attorney General,
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, by and through Alan Wilson Attorney General,
et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, in her official capacity as the Secretary of the United
States Department of Health and Human Services, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
___________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
___________________________
BRIEF OF CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY
___________________________
ROBIN S. CONRAD
SHANE B. KAWKA
National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc.
1615 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20062
(202) 463-5337

K. LEE BLALACK, II
Counsel of Record
BRIAN BOYLE
JOSHUA DEAHL
O’Melveny & Myers LLP
1625 Eye Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 383-5300

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

State of Florida, et al. v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., et al.
Nos. 11-11021-HH, 11-11067-HH
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1, undersigned counsel certifies that amicus
is not a publicly held corporation and that no corporation or other publicly held
entity owns more than 10% of its stock. Pursuant to 11th Circuit Rule 26.1-1,
undersigned counsel for amicus certifies that, to the best of his knowledge, the list
of persons or entities that have or may have an interest in the outcome of this case
is adequately set forth in the Appellants’ opening brief and the subsequently filed
briefs of the other amici in this case, except for the following additions:
Amicus Curiae
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Blalack, K. Lee II
Boyle, Brian
Conrad, Robin S.
Deahl, Joshua
Kawka, Shane B.
O’Melveny & Myers LLP
/s/ Joshua Deahl
Joshua Deahl

C-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS ....................................................C-1
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .....................................................C-1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii
INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE........................................................................1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................2
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................8
I.

IF THE MINIMUM COVERAGE MANDATE IS HELD TO EXCEED
CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS, HEALTH INSURANCE
REFORM PROVISIONS IN THE PPACA SHOULD ALSO BE
INVALIDATED AS NON-SEVERABLE FROM THE MANDATE ...........8
A.

Applying Severability Analysis to the PPACA ....................................8

B.

A Proper Approach to Severability Compels the Conclusion that
the PPACA’s Guaranteed-Issue and Community-Rating Provisions
Are Non-Severable from the Individual Mandate...............................12

C.

Health Insurance Reforms Beyond the Guaranteed-Issue and
Community-Rating Provisions Are Similarly Intertwined With the
Individual Mandate for Severability Purposes....................................17

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

II.

1.

The PPACA’s risk-adjustment provision .................................17

2.

The PPACA’s bar on annual limits for benefits .......................19

3.

The PPACA’s Medical Loss Ratio provision ...........................21

IF THIS COURT AFFIRMS THE INVALIDATION OF THE
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE BUT DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE
ENTIRE ACT, IT SHOULD REMAND TO THE DISTRICT COURT TO
CONDUCT A PROPER SEVERABILITY ANALYSIS IN THE FIRST
INSTANCE....................................................................................................26

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................29

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Ackerley Commc’ns of Mass., Inc. v. City of Cambridge,
135 F.3d 210 (1st Cir. 1998)...............................................................................27
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock,
480 U.S. 678 (1987)................................................................................... 8, 9, 12
Am. Banker’s Ass’n v. Gould,
412 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2005) ............................................................................27
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936)............................................................................................16
Chesapeake B&M, Inc. v. Harford County, Md.,
58 F.3d 1005 (4th Cir. 1995) ..............................................................................27
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010)..........................................................................................8
Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach,
574 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................27
Virginia v. Sebelius,
728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) ............................................................ 9, 10

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Vt. Right of Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell,
211 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2000) ...............................................................................27
Statutes
26 U.S.C. § 4001......................................................................................................26
26 U.S.C. § 5000A ........................................................................................... passim
42 U.S.C. § 18031....................................................................................................26
42 U.S.C. § 18063................................................................................... 6, 17, 18, 19
42 U.S.C. § 18091............................................................................................ passim
42 U.S.C. § 300gg....................................................................................... 10, 13, 28
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1.................................................................................... 10, 13, 28
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2.................................................................................... 10, 13, 28
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3.................................................................................... 10, 13, 28
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4.................................................................................... 10, 13, 28
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5.................................................................................................13
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6.................................................................................................13
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-7.................................................................................................13

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 ..............................................................................................19
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18 ....................................................................................... 21, 23
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-94 ..............................................................................................26
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304.17A-060 (1994) .............................................................15
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 24-A, § 2736-C ...........................................................................15
N.H. Rev. Stat. § 420-G:6........................................................................................15
N.J. Stat. § 17B:27A-22 ...........................................................................................15
N.Y. Ins. L. §§ 3231, 3232 ......................................................................................15
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 4080B ...................................................................................15
Wash. Code § 48.43.012 ..........................................................................................15
Rules
Fed. R. App. P. 25......................................................................................................1
Fed. R. App. P. 29....................................................................................................12
Interim Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,188 (June 28, 2010) .......................................19
Legislative History
H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 255 (as passed by House, Nov. 7, 2009) .........................9

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Hearing of the Oversight & Investigations Subcomm. of the H. Energy &
Commerce Comm. (Feb. 16, 2011).....................................................................20
Making Health Care Work for American Families: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th
Cong. 11 (Mar. 17, 2009) ...................................................................................14
Other Authorities
Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Medical Loss Ratio ........................................24
General Accounting Office, Health Care Reform: Considerations for
Risk Adjustment under Community Rating, GAO/HEHS 94-173 ......................18
Jonathan Gruber, Center for American Progress, Why We Need the
Individual Mandate, at 1 (Apr. 8, 2010).............................................................15
Mark A. Hall, An Evaluation of New York’s Reform Law,
25 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 71, 97 (2000)........................................................15
Bradley Herring, An Economic Perspective on the Individual
Mandate’s Severability from the PPACA,
364 New Eng. J. Med. 16e (Mar. 10, 2011) .................................................14, 25

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Adele M. Kirk, Riding the Bull: Experience with Individual Market
Reform in Washington, Kentucky and Massachusetts,
25 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 133 (2000)............................................................16
Robert Kuttner, The Risk-Adjustment Debate,
339 New Eng. J. Med. 1952 (Dec. 24, 1998) ...............................................17, 18
Anthony T. Lasso, National Institute for Health Care Management
Foundation, Community Rating and Guaranteed Issue in the
Individual Health Insurance Market (Jan. 2011) ...............................................15
Letter from Roger A. Sevigny, N.H. Ins. Comm’r, to Sec. Kathleen
Sebelius, (Jan. 6, 2011).......................................................................................24
Letter from Sharon P. Clark, Ky. Ins. Comm’r, to Sec. Kathleen
Sebelius (Feb. 16, 2011) .....................................................................................24
Letter from Steven B. Larsen to Mila Kofman, Me. Superintendent of
Ins. (Mar. 8, 2011) ........................................................................................24, 25
Roberta B. Meyer, Justification for Permitting Life Insurers to
Continue to Underwrite on the Basis of Genetic Information and
Genetic Test Results, 27 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1271 (1993) ..................................15

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
President Barack Obama, Remarks to a Joint Session of Congress on Health Care
(Sept. 9, 2009).......................................................................................................2
Robert Pear, Four States Get Waivers to Carry Out Health Law, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 17, 2011.......................................................................................................21
Scoreboard, Politico, Apr. 1, 2011 ..........................................................................24

viii

INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE1
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (the Chamber)
is the world’s largest business federation, representing 300,000 direct members and
indirectly representing an underlying membership of three million businesses and
professional organizations of every size, in every industry sector, and from every region
of the country. At least 98 percent of the Chamber’s members are small businesses
with one hundred or fewer employees. The Chamber advocates on issues of vital
concern to the nation’s business community and has frequently participated as
amicus curiae before this Court and other courts. The provision of health
insurance is of considerable interest to Chamber members, since many of them are
employers who provide health insurance to their employees. Indeed, employers
are the country’s largest providers of health insurance, providing coverage for more
than 160 million people and more than 60 percent of nonelderly Americans.

1

The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Fed. R. App. P.
25(a). No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no such
counsel or any party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the
preparation or submission of this brief. Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5)(A)–(B). No
person or entity—other than amicus, its members, or its counsel—made a
monetary contribution intended to fund this brief’s preparation or submission. Fed.
R. App. P. 29(c)(5)(C).
1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA or the Act)
contains an extensive set of reforms primarily intended to make health insurance
available to and affordable for millions of uninsured Americans and increase the
quality of health insurance for all Americans. See President Barack Obama,
Remarks to a Joint Session of Congress on Health Care (Sept. 9, 2009), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/remarks-by-the-president-to-ajoint-session-of-congress-on-health-care (“[I]f you’re one of the tens of millions of
Americans who don’t currently have health insurance … this plan will finally offer
you quality, affordable choices.”). The Act’s insurance reforms are interdependent
and built upon one central provision: the minimum coverage mandate in Section
1501. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1501(a), 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a).
The individual mandate is central to the health insurance reforms because
Congress understood that it could not simply prohibit insurers from denying
coverage or increasing the costs of coverage to the unhealthiest subscribers.
Standing alone, those restrictions (the core of which is known as the guaranteedissue and community-rating reforms) would make health insurance less affordable
because individuals would wait to purchase health insurance until they absolutely
needed it, forcing insurers to raise premiums for everyone else. To prevent this,
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Congress’s solution was to include a minimum coverage requirement in the
PPACA—the so-called individual mandate.
By requiring individuals to maintain a minimum level of health insurance
coverage, the individual mandate prevents the type of adverse selection that would
otherwise undermine the PPACA’s insurance market reforms. The individual
mandate makes it possible for the guaranteed-issue, community-rating, and other
insurance reforms to function as Congress intended. As Congress explained, the
individual mandate “is essential to creating effective health insurance markets in
which improved health insurance products that … do not exclude coverage of
preexisting conditions can be sold.” 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I).
This Court has received substantial briefing on the question of whether the
individual mandate represents a valid exercise of Congress’s constitutional powers.
Amicus does not address this issue and takes no position on the constitutionality of
the individual mandate, but instead submits this brief to address a secondary
question—viz., if the individual mandate were held to exceed Congress’s powers,
which additional provisions of the PPACA should be considered non-severable
from the individual mandate and thus fall with it.
The district court below concluded that it was impossible to sever the
individual mandate from the PPACA, and it therefore struck down the entire Act
upon finding the mandate unconstitutional. Record Excerpts (RE) 2074-75. That
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court correctly emphasized the centrality of the mandate to the PPACA, concluded
that the mandate was essential to the operation of the PPACA’s health insurance
market reforms, and determined that those reforms could not survive without the
mandate. RE 2072-74. That court further reasoned that the PPACA’s health
insurance reforms comprise the core of the Act, and that any effort to engage in a
line-by-line analysis of the 2,700 page Act to identify discrete provisions that
should remain standing independently of the mandate would amount to a judicial
reconstruction of the Act. RE 2074-75. Therefore, that court struck down the
entirety of the Act, reasoning that any effort to implement health care reform
absent the individual mandate is a task best left to Congress. RE 2075.
If this Court agrees with the district court that the individual mandate is
unconstitutional, the Court will then need to consider whether, as the district court
determined, invalidation of the mandate requires setting aside the PPACA in its
entirety. If the Court disagrees with the district court’s severability analysis, the
prudent course is to remand to the district court for close scrutiny of the PPACA
provisions to assess which of the remaining provisions Congress would have
enacted in the absence of the individual mandate. Such an assessment would
require examining whether the remaining provisions and insurance reform
requirements would function as intended without the individual mandate.
Applying those standards here, this Court must conclude that, at a minimum, the
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health insurance reform provisions in the PPACA are non-severable from the
individual mandate and would necessarily fall with it. If the PPACA’s remaining
insurance reform provisions were left standing in the absence of the mandate,
individuals and employers who sponsor health insurance coverage for their
employees would surely encounter significant market disruption. Health care costs
would rise and fewer individuals would obtain coverage—precisely the opposite of
Congress’s intentions.
For instance, the United States has explained that two of the principal health
insurance reforms enacted by the PPACA—the guaranteed-issue and communityrating reforms—would necessarily fall with the minimum coverage mandate. See
U.S. Br. at 59; RE 1765 (“As defendants have made clear . . . the guaranteed issue
and community insurance industry reforms in Section 1201 will stand or fall with
the minimum coverage mandate.”). In the absence of the mandate, individuals
would be encouraged to forgo purchasing insurance until they become sick,
thereby causing an increase in insurance premiums for the remaining consumers.
The increase in premiums would in turn cause healthy individuals to relinquish (or
refrain from obtaining) health insurance, causing premiums to rise still further.
This “premium spiral” has been experienced in various states that have enacted
similar health insurance reforms without an accompanying minimum coverage
mandate (such as New York, Kentucky, and Washington). The legislative record

5

confirms that Congress understood this dynamic and would not have enacted
guaranteed-issue and community-rating reforms in the absence of the individual
mandate.
But the severability inquiry does not—and cannot—end with the guaranteedissue and community-rating reforms alone. Rather, other insurance reforms in the
PPACA, beyond guaranteed-issue and community-rating, are also dependent on
the individual mandate. As one example, the Act’s risk adjustment mechanism
would not function properly without the individual mandate and the associated
community-rating and guaranteed-issue reforms. PPACA § 1343, 42 U.S.C.
§ 18063. Risk adjustment provisions are necessary to counterbalance the incentive
created by guaranteed issue and community rating for insurers to seek out healthy
subscribers, in lieu of unhealthy subscribers. This incentive exists because
guaranteed issue and community rating prevent insurers from underwriting and
pricing products based on the risk presented. The PPACA’s risk adjustment
mechanism counteracts those incentives by reallocating premium revenues among
insurers so that each insurer receives an amount proportional to its actual risk
exposure. But if the mandate, guaranteed-issue, and community-rating provisions
were invalidated and the risk adjustment mechanism remained, gross inefficiencies
in the health insurance markets would exist, allowing insurers to pass off to others
the consequences of flawed underwriting and poor management of health care

6

costs. This would lead to an increase in health insurance costs, undermining one of
the primary aims of the PPACA.
Amicus does not purport to catalog here the full complement of provisions in
the Act that should be deemed non-severable from the individual mandate.
Instead, the principal purpose of this brief is to demonstrate that basic severability
principles would dictate that many provisions of the Act are non-severable from
the individual mandate. If this Court is not inclined to invalidate the Act in its
entirety, the prudent course would be to remand the case to the district court with
instructions to conduct further analysis on this issue. A remand would enable the
district court to supplement the record and obtain additional briefing and evidence
on the interrelationship of the minimum coverage mandate and the health insurance
reform provisions in the PPACA.

7

ARGUMENT
I. IF THE MINIMUM COVERAGE MANDATE IS HELD TO EXCEED
CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS, HEALTH INSURANCE
REFORM PROVISIONS IN THE PPACA SHOULD ALSO BE
INVALIDATED AS NON-SEVERABLE FROM THE MANDATE
A. Applying Severability Analysis to the PPACA
As the Supreme Court has explained, when a court strikes down a particular
statutory provision on the grounds that it exceeds Congress’s constitutional
powers, the remaining provisions in the act will remain standing “[u]nless it is
evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are
within its power, independently of that which is not.” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v.
Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (quotation marks omitted); see also Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010). In
short, the question is whether Congress would have enacted the remaining
provisions in the absence of the invalid one. See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685
(“The final test” for severability holds that “the unconstitutional provision must be
severed unless the statute created in its absence is legislation that Congress would
not have enacted.”). That overarching question turns on an assessment of whether
the remaining provisions “will function in a manner consistent with the intent of
Congress” in the absence of the invalidated provision. Id.
Congress can “ease[]” the inquiry by enacting a severability clause that
expressly dictates that if any provision is invalidated, it should be considered
8

severable from the remainder of the statute. Id. at 686. In that case, there is a
“presumption” that the “objectionable provision can be excised from the remainder
of the statute,” leaving the remaining provisions intact. Id. This presumption does
not apply to the PPACA, however, because Congress chose not to include a
severability clause in the Act. Indeed, Congress considered one version of the
legislation that would ultimately become the PPACA that contained a severability
clause. See H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 255 (as passed by House, Nov. 7, 2009) (“If
any provision of this Act … is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of the
provisions of this Act … shall not be affected.”). Congress elected to pass the bill
without a severability clause.
Thus far, two district courts have found the mandate unconstitutional and
have applied severability analysis to the PPACA, reaching divergent conclusions.
In Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010), the court effectively
bypassed the required severability analysis after observing that, “without the
benefit of extensive expert testimony and significant supplementation of the
record, this Court cannot determine what, if any, portion of the bill would not be
able to survive independently.” Id. at 789. Rather than supplement the record and
hear expert testimony, however, the court mechanically and without explanation
ruled that other PPACA provisions were non-severable from the mandate only if
they explicitly cross-reference the mandate. Id. at 790. That unprecedented and
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formalistic approach to severability implicates an arbitrary handful of the PPACA
provisions without regard to the basic question of which provisions Congress
would have enacted in the absence of the mandate.2 Indeed, that approach would
even leave intact the PPACA’s guaranteed-issue and community-rating reforms, 42
U.S.C. §§ 300gg–300gg-4, which the United States has rightly explained could not
survive without the mandate but do not explicitly cross-reference it.
The district court below, by contrast, correctly emphasized Congress’s
findings that the individual mandate is essential to the guaranteed-issue and
community-rating provisions. RE 2071-72. The court concluded that those
provisions of the Act, as the United States has recognized, could not survive
without the mandate. RE 2071-72. As the court explained, “the individual
mandate is indisputably necessary to the Act’s insurance market reforms, which
are, in turn, indisputably necessary to the purpose of the Act.” RE 2072. For that
reason—and because the PPACA lacks a severability clause—the Court struck
down the Act in its entirety as non-severable from the mandate. RE 2075. Any
other conclusion, the court explained, would call for a line-by-line, judicial

2

The court made no effort to identify which provisions of the PPACA—if
any—specifically reference the mandate. Thirteen statutory provisions include one
or more references to 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, the provision codifying the mandate.
See PPACA §§ 1001, 1251, 1302, 1311, 1312, 1331, 1332, 1401, 1411, 1512,
1514, 9001, and 9014.
10

rewriting of a complex and interwoven congressional enactment, a quasilegislative function best left to Congress in the first instance. RE 2075.
The district court’s approach allows Congress, rather than the courts in the
first instance, to decide what elements of the PPACA should remain the law of the
land absent the mandate. However, if this Court were to disagree with this
approach and decline to invalidate the PPACA in its entirety, applicable
severability principles at least would require careful examination of the
interrelationship between the mandate and the PPACA’s health insurance reforms.
In particular, there are compelling reasons for recognizing the non-severability of
health insurance reform provisions beyond those that the United States has
expressly identified as non-severable from the mandate—the guaranteed-issue and
community-rating provisions.
Amicus does not attempt in this brief to compile an exhaustive catalog of the
particular PPACA health insurance reforms that must fall with the mandate under
an appropriate severability analysis. Instead, it first explains why the communityrating and guaranteed-issue reforms are non-severable from the mandate, and
further illustrates why the list of non-severable provisions cannot end there. An
examination of several health insurance reforms in the PPACA illustrates the
interconnection between the individual mandate and various PPACA provisions.

11

B. A Proper Approach to Severability Compels the Conclusion that the
PPACA’s Guaranteed-Issue and Community-Rating Provisions Are
Non-Severable from the Individual Mandate
In this case and in related litigation, the United States has explained that the
PPACA’s guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions cannot survive
without the individual mandate. RE 1765 (“Because Congress would not have
intended this result, these reforms cannot be severed from the minimum coverage
provision.”). Those reforms prohibit denying coverage or raising premiums based
on preexisting conditions, and in the absence of the mandate, they would not
“function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress.” Alaska Airlines,
480 U.S. at 685. Congress explained the interrelationship between those reforms
and the mandate in the express terms of the Act:
[I]f there were no [minimum coverage] requirement, many individuals
would wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care. By
significantly increasing health insurance coverage, the requirement,
together with the other provisions of this Act, will minimize this
adverse selection and broaden the health insurance risk pool to include
healthy individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums. The
requirement is essential to creating effective health insurance markets
in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue
and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.
PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I). In light of Congress’s own
explanation of its intent, the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions
plainly should be deemed non-severable from the mandate.

12

The PPACA’s guaranteed-issue provisions bar health insurers from denying
coverage based on a subscriber’s preexisting conditions or medical history. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(a) (“A group health plan and a health insurance issuer
offering group or individual health insurance coverage may not establish rules for
eligibility (including continued eligibility) of any individual to enroll under the
terms of the plan or coverage based on any of the following health status-related
factors….”). The PPACA’s community-rating provisions prescribe that insurers
may not charge higher premiums based on preexisting conditions and certain other
factors. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1). Those provisions thus preclude health
insurers from raising premiums based on any condition other than age, geography,
and tobacco use. The provisions also establish limits on the extent of permissible
variations in premiums based on those three factors. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg(a)(1)(A)(ii) – (iv).3
Congress understood that, in the absence of the individual mandate, the
guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions would disrupt the health
insurance market due to adverse selection. If health insurance companies may not
adjust premiums or deny coverage based on preexisting conditions, healthy
individuals would have little incentive to obtain insurance until they become sick
3

Both the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions are found in
Title I, Section 1201 of the PPACA. PPACA § 1201, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300gg – 300gg-7.
13

and need coverage, because they know full well that they will be able to obtain
insurance at the same price at such a time. Therefore, healthy persons would opt
out of the insurance market, which would leave health insurers little choice but to
raise premiums to account for the diminished health (on average) of their
subscribers. This increase in premiums will cause more healthy individuals to
forgo health insurance, further increasing premiums, and so on. As the United
States has starkly explained, “[a]bsent a minimum coverage provision, the
guaranteed-issue and community-rating reforms in Section 1201 would incentivize
many to drop coverage, leading to a spiral of increased premiums and a shrinking
risk pool—the insurance market will ‘implode.’” RE 1765; see also Making
Health Care Work for American Families: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 11 (Mar. 17, 2009),
available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090317/
testimony_reinhardt.pdf (testimony of Prof. Uwe E. Reinhardt) (“It is well known
that community-rating and guaranteed issue, coupled with voluntary insurance,
tends to lead to a death spiral of individual insurance.”).4
4

Experts in the health care field share the view that the individual mandate
is essential to the intended operation of the PPACA’s guaranteed-issue and
community-rating provisions. See, e.g., Bradley Herring, An Economic
Perspective on the Individual Mandate’s Severability from the PPACA, 364 New
Eng. J. Med. 16e (Mar. 10, 2011), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.
1056/NEJMpv1101519?ssource=hcrc (“Although they are politically popular,
these community-rating and guaranteed-issue provisions can reduce the stability of
14

Congress’s concerns about an “implosion” of the health insurance market
are reinforced by the experience that various states have had when implementing
comparable community-rating and guaranteed-issue provisions without an
individual mandate. Seven states have enacted guaranteed-issue laws without an
accompanying mandate. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304.17A-060(2)(A) (1994)
(repealed); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 24-A, § 2736-C(3); N.H. Rev. Stat. § 420-G:6
(1994); N.J. Stat. § 17B:27A-22; N.Y. Ins. L. §§ 3231, 3232; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, §
4080B(d)(1); Wash. Code § 48.43.012(1). Studies in those states reveal precisely
the type of adverse selection problems that Congress sought to avoid in the
PPACA. See Mark A. Hall, An Evaluation of New York’s Reform Law, 25 J.
Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 71, 97 (2000) (“Following reform, the overall percentage of
the population with insurance has worsened….”); Roberta B. Meyer, Justification
for Permitting Life Insurers to Continue to Underwrite on the Basis of Genetic
Information and Genetic Test Results, 27 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1271, 1291 (1993)

private health insurance markets.… The primary purpose of the individual
mandate is to mitigate this adverse selection….”); Anthony T. Lasso, National
Institute for Health Care Management Foundation, Community Rating and
Guaranteed Issue in the Individual Health Insurance Market, at 2 (Jan. 2011),
available at http://nihcm.org/pdf/EV-LoSassoFINAL.pdf (stressing the “distortions
that can result from community rating and guaranteed issue regulations in the nongroup market when there are no provisions in place to keep people enrolled in
coverage”); Jonathan Gruber, Center for American Progress, Why We Need the
Individual Mandate, at 1 (Apr. 8, 2010), available at http://www.americanprogress
.org /issues/ 2010/04/pdf/individual_mandate.pdf (“Without the individual
mandate, the entire structure of reform would fail.”).
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(New York’s community rating requirement “has led to an increase in rates for
young, healthy insureds” and “many of them have dropped their health insurance
coverage”). Indeed, the Kentucky market reforms were repealed because they
destabilized the health insurance market. Cf. Adele M. Kirk, Riding the Bull:
Experience with Individual Market Reform in Washington, Kentucky and
Massachusetts, 25 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 133, 151 (2000) (“The Kentucky
reform experience has become notorious for the mass exit of insurers from its
market.”).
For those reasons, there is no basis to doubt Congress’s express
understanding that the individual mandate is “essential” to the proper functioning
of a health insurance market that includes the PPACA’s guaranteed-issue and
community-rating provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I). The mandate and those
reforms are a tightly interwoven group, which presumably stands or falls together.
Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 315-16 (1936) (“These two sets of
requirements are not like a collection of bricks, some of which may be taken away
without disturbing the others, but rather are like the interwoven threads
constituting the warp and woof of a fabric, one set of which cannot be removed
without fatal consequences to the whole.”).
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C. Health Insurance Reforms Beyond the Guaranteed-Issue and CommunityRating Provisions Are Similarly Intertwined With the Individual Mandate
for Severability Purposes
While explaining that the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions
would necessarily fall if the individual mandate were to be invalidated, the United
States thus far has deferred any comprehensive effort to identify or assess which
additional provisions in the PPACA it would deem non-severable from the
mandate. U.S. Br. 55-60. If this Court disagrees with the district court below and
declines to invalidate the PPACA in its entirety, there are compelling reasons for
recognizing the non-severability of other health insurance reform provisions.
1. The PPACA’s risk-adjustment provision
The risk adjustment provision in Section 1343 of the PPACA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 18063, would not function as Congress intended without the individual mandate
and its associated guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions. Under a
community-rating system, health plans generally obtain the same premium per
subscriber, regardless of a subscriber’s health status, gender, or other demographic
factors. Health plans with healthier members may receive a windfall because they
earn an identical premium (per subscriber) to plans that must pay more in claims.
See Robert Kuttner, The Risk-Adjustment Debate, 339 New Eng. J. Med. 1952,
1952 (Dec. 24, 1998) (“If plans receive the same unadjusted premium for each
subscriber, then the plan with healthier members reaps an unearned windfall.”).
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This system rewards so-called “cream skimming,” i.e., efforts to attract healthier
subscribers and discourage riskier individuals, instead of rewarding the provision
of quality service. Id. at 1952.
The PPACA’s risk adjustment provision in Section 1343 counteracts those
incentives by reallocating premiums in a manner proportional to the actuarial risk
of each health insurer’s subscribers. Under the risk adjustment provision, states
must levy a charge on insurers whose level of actuarial risk falls below the
statewide average. 42 U.S.C. § 18063. States then transfer those funds to health
insurers carrying an actuarial risk exceeding the statewide average. By aligning
premium revenues with actuarial risk, the risk-adjustment mechanism diminishes
the incentive to target healthier populations. See General Accounting Office,
Health Care Reform: Considerations for Risk Adjustment under Community
Rating, GAO/HEHS 94-173, at 1 (Sept. 22, 1994), available at
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat2/152795.pdf (risk adjustment is meant to “reduce the
undesirable effects of community rating on insurers’ incentives”).
If the individual mandate and the associated community-rating reforms were
invalidated, the risk-adjustment provision would not function as Congress
intended. Without community rating, health insurers would apply traditional
underwriting principles, varying premium rates based on health risk and other
relevant factors. In such market conditions, a health insurer’s premiums should
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already reflect the actuarial risk of its subscribers. Thus, imposing a riskadjustment mechanism under these market conditions would transfer premium
dollars from health insurers, who accurately assessed the actuarial risk of their
subscribers, to other insurers who misjudged their risk pools. In fact, it could
create a disincentive for insurers to appropriately manage health care costs;
instead, insurers may choose to forgo expending resources to appropriately manage
health care costs, relying instead on the risk adjustment mechanism to recoup any
losses they may have sustained. That, in turn, would create gross inefficiencies
unintended by Congress and contrary to one of the central aims of the PPACA:
promoting affordable health care. The risk-adjustment provision in Section 1343
thus is non-severable from the individual mandate and community-rating reforms.
2. The PPACA’s bar on annual limits for benefits
Section 1001 of the PPACA severely restricts, and eventually prohibits,
health insurers from imposing annual limits on the benefits paid to subscribers.
PPACA § 1001; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11. These restrictions currently dictate that
annual limits may not be less than $750,000 per person. Interim Final Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. 37,188-01 (June 28, 2010). That floor increases to $1.25 million per
person in September, 2011, to $2 million per person in September, 2012, and plans
with annual limits will be phased out entirely by 2014. Id. This reform provision
will eliminate plans with low annual limits, including so called “mini-med” or
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“limited benefit” plans, often the most affordable plans for individuals with limited
income.
This prohibition against annual limits only functions as intended when
considered alongside the individual mandate and guaranteed-issue reforms. As
previously noted, the primary purpose of the individual mandate is to avoid the
potential premium spiral of continually deteriorating risk pools and escalating
premiums. Congress appreciated that the mandate was critical to minimizing
“adverse selection and broaden[ing] the health insurance risk pool to include
healthy individuals … [in order to] lower health insurance premiums.” PPACA
§ 1501(a)(2)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I). But if the bar on annual limits were
enforced in the absence of the individual mandate and guaranteed-issue reforms, it
would eliminate one of the most affordable health insurance options for lower
income individuals and thereby expand the pool of uninsured individuals contrary
to Congress’s intent.
While the PPACA’s restrictions on low annual limits have technically
already taken effect, the Department of Health and Human Services has liberally
granted waivers to enable low-cost plans to continue operating until the mandate
and guaranteed-issue provisions become effective. See Hearing of the Oversight &
Investigations Subcomm. of the H. Energy & Commerce Comm. (Feb. 16, 2011)
(testimony of Steven Larsen) (“[I]n establishing the waiver process … we did want
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to make sure that people who have that coverage … can continue that coverage”).
To date, the Department has granted approximately one thousand waivers to plans
with annual limits below the current $750,000 threshold, exempting them from the
Act’s annual limit requirements. See Robert Pear, Four States Get Waivers to
Carry Out Health Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2011, at A22. The Department has
also granted waivers to four states, exempting all plans operating within their
borders from PPACA’s annual limit requirements. Id. The Department’s
decisions to grant waivers to these plans demonstrate that the regulation of annual
limits cannot function as intended without the individual mandate and guaranteedissue reforms.
3. The PPACA’s Medical Loss Ratio provision
The PPACA’s Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) requirement, also contained in
Section 1001 of the PPACA, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18, is another example of a
provision that is inextricably linked to the individual mandate. “Medical Loss
Ratio” refers to the percentage of each premium dollar expended by an insurer on
the provision of health care to its subscribers, as opposed to other expenses such as
administrative costs, salaries, advertising, and profits. The PPACA establishes a
minimum MLR of eighty percent for individual and small group coverage, and
eighty-five percent for large group coverage. PPACA § 1001, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg18.
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Congress predicated the MLR provision on the reduction in administrative
costs that would accompany the individual mandate and guaranteed-issue reforms.
42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(J) (“By significantly increasing health insurance coverage
and the size of purchasing pools … [PPACA] will significantly reduce
administrative costs and lower health insurance premiums.”). Conversely, absent
the mandate’s expanded risk pool and community-rating provisions (provisions
which have the effect of drastically reducing underwriting costs), administrative
costs are necessarily higher. See 42 U.S.C. § 18901(a)(2)(J) (pre-PPACA,
“[a]dministrative costs for private health insurance … are 26 to 30 percent of
premiums in the current individual and small group markets,” an amount greater
than the administrative costs contemplated under applicable MLR caps).
Therefore, the MLR provision assumes the existence of the individual mandate.
The MLR provision also works in tandem with the individual mandate
because the mandate increases the total number of subscribers in the risk pool,
which in turn facilitates the estimation of costs in any given year. To function as
intended, the MLR provision requires health insurers to price their premiums based
on the expected amount of claims they will have to pay each year. With a
sufficiently sizable risk pool, health insurers can make those predictions with a fair
degree of accuracy. But if the individual mandate falls, insurers (particularly those
in locations with smaller risk pools) could be subject to extreme variations in MLR
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ratios year-over-year, which are only exacerbated by the ability of individuals to
move in and out of the risk pool on the basis of their current health status (i.e., sick
people will move in and healthy people will move out).
Those fluctuations could be accommodated over time if health insurers were
permitted to make long-term predictions based on the knowledge that any
fluctuations in MLR would eventually even out over a number of years. But the
PPACA’s MLR requirements prevent health insurers from insulating themselves
against such fluctuations by requiring plans to refund excess profits in each
profitable year.5 This prevents insurers from protecting themselves against lean
years. In other words, the MLR provision can only function as Congress intended
if health insurers can accurately predict their costs year by year, and those
predictions in turn rest on the increased risk pool that the individual mandate
would produce.
Therefore, it is no surprise that a number of states have requested
exemptions from the MLR requirements in the PPACA until the mandate takes
effect. For instance, Kentucky has asked that the MLR requirement remain at
Kentucky’s present MLR requirement of sixty-five percent for 2011, with five

5

After the individual mandate takes effect in 2014, any refund owed under
the MLR provision will be calculated based on the three-year period preceding the
MLR deficiency, rather than being calculated based only on the prior year. 42
U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(B)(ii).
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percent increases each year until it reaches eighty percent in 2014. Letter from
Sharon P. Clark, Ky. Ins. Comm’r, to Sec. Kathleen Sebelius (Feb. 16, 2011).
New Hampshire has requested that the MLR requirement remain at seventy percent
until 2014 and noted that, without this exemption, “[t]he loss of carriers providing
individual insurance in New Hampshire will have a destabilizing effect on the
market.” Letter from Roger A. Sevigny, N.H. Ins. Comm’r, to Sec. Kathleen
Sebelius, (Jan. 6, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/
mlr_adj_req_01062010.pdf. Maine, Georgia, Florida, Nevada, Louisiana, Iowa,
and North Dakota have also requested an exemption from the PPACA’s MLR
requirements and many other states have signaled their intent to do the same in the
coming months. See Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Medical Loss Ratio,
available at http://cciio.cms.gov/programs/marketreforms/mlr/index.html;
Scoreboard, Politico, Apr. 1, 2011, available at http://www.politico.com/politico
pulse/0411/politicopulse469.html (reporting that six additional states are leaning
toward filing a request for an exemption).
The Department of Health and Human Services has issued one ruling on
these waiver requests so far, granting Maine an exemption from the Act’s MLR
requirements and adjusting Maine’s individual health insurance market MLR rate
to sixty-five percent through 2013. Letter from Steven B. Larsen to Mila Kofman,
Me. Superintendent of Ins. (Mar. 8, 2011), available at http://cciio.cms.gov/
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programs/marketreforms/mlr/states/maine/maine_decision_letter_3_8_11.pdf. The
ruling that granted Maine’s waiver request explicitly noted that “there is a
reasonable likelihood” that insurers “would exit the Maine individual market in the
absence of an adjustment to the 80 percent MLR standard.” Id. at 16. This waiver,
along with those that are sure to be granted in the near future, demonstrates that the
Act’s MLR provision is predicated on the individual mandate, and cannot function
as intended without the mandate.
*

*

*

*

*

These examples generally illustrate the need, under settled severability
principles, to closely examine the interrelationships between the PPACA’s
individual mandate and the statute’s health insurance reforms. The examples are
only illustrative: experts have identified additional provisions that Congress may
not have implemented in the absence of the mandate and associated communityrating and guaranteed-issue reforms. See Herring, supra, New Eng. J. Med.
(discussing additional provisions that may not function as intended without the
mandate). Congress clearly contemplated the operation of the PPACA’s health
insurance reforms in conjunction with the individual mandate, not in its absence.6
RE 2071-75.
6

The PPACA contains a host of health insurance reform provisions beyond those
discussed in this brief that require close scrutiny to determine if they are severable
from the mandate. The “rate review” provision, PPACA § 1003, 42 U.S.C.
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II. IF THIS COURT AFFIRMS THE INVALIDATION OF THE
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE BUT DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE
ENTIRE ACT, IT SHOULD REMAND TO THE DISTRICT COURT TO
CONDUCT A PROPER SEVERABILITY ANALYSIS IN THE FIRST
INSTANCE
If this Court concludes that the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s
constitutional authority, then it must determine whether to affirm the district
court’s conclusion that the mandate is so central to the PPACA that the entire
statute must be invalidated. In the event that this Court does not invalidate the
PPACA in its entirety (or the Act’s full package of insurance reforms), the court
should rely on established severability principles and remand the issue to the
district court to assess which PPACA provisions should be invalidated as nonseverable from the individual mandate.
The scope of severability—if indeed severability is found to be warranted at
all—would be best determined by the district court after the parties have an
opportunity to supplement the evidentiary record. A remand would properly
enable the district court to expand and supplement the record to facilitate a
meaningful inquiry into the interrelationship between the mandate and the
PPACA’s various health insurance reforms.

§ 300gg-94, the health insurance exchanges, PPACA § 1311, 42 U.S.C. § 18031,
and the health insurance provider tax, PPACA § 9010, 26 U.S.C. § 4001, are
further examples of insurance reforms that were calibrated to function alongside
the mandate. While the PPACA’s insurance reforms are primarily located in Title
I, they are interspersed throughout the Act.
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As a general matter, “severability disputes usually turn on fact-intensive
inquiries best left to the trial court in the first instance.” Ackerley Commc’ns of
Mass., Inc. v. City of Cambridge, 135 F.3d 210, 214−15 (1st Cir. 1998). As a
result, even when confronting severability questions of substantially lesser
complexity than those presented here, the courts of appeals frequently remand to
allow the district court to conduct the analysis in the first instance. See
Chesapeake B&M, Inc. v. Harford County, Md., 58 F.3d 1005, 1012−13 (4th Cir.
1995) (“[W]e remand to the district court to determine whether and to what extent
the licensing scheme is severable from the remainder of the Licensing Law.”); see
also Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 574 F.3d 1011, 1016
(9th Cir. 2009) (“We remand to allow the district court to determine whether the
unconstitutional provisions are severable from the remainder.”); Am. Banker’s
Ass’n v. Gould, 412 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Because there is a
possibility that some part of these provisions may survive preemption, we remand
to the district court.”); Vt. Right of Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 211 F.3d 376, 389
(2d Cir. 2000) (directing “the district court, on remand, to analyze the issue of
severability in the first instance”).
In the event the Court declines to invalidate the entire Act, additional
considerations compel a remand in this case. The United States did not fully brief
severability questions before the district court, but instead took the position that
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“[w]orking through the complex permutations presented by the issue of
severability is an effort best undertaken in separate briefing if this case reaches that
stage.” RE 1763. Thus, the United States has yet to fully address its views
regarding the proper scope of severability if the individual mandate is stricken. In
addition, even if the Court were inclined to limit a finding of non-severability to
those provisions that the United States has itself acknowledged must fall (i.e., the
guaranteed-issue and community-rating reforms), it is not clear which precise
statutory provisions would be stricken. There is no single provision of the Act that
embodies all of the guaranteed-issue reforms, nor is there a single provision that
constitutes the community-rating reforms. Rather, elements of these reforms are
contained within multiple statutory provisions. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg1−300gg-4. Therefore, even a narrow severability ruling would be difficult to
implement at the appellate level and would be better suited to the determination of
a district court on remand after receipt of additional briefing. Also, as explained
above, there is a need for a close examination of the other health insurance reforms
contained in the PPACA. The district court is better positioned to receive evidence
and consider full briefing devoted to these issues, along with expert testimony and
expansion of the record as needed.
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CONCLUSION
If this Court determines that the minimum coverage mandate is
unconstitutional and declines to invalidate the entire Act, it should remand the case
to the district court to receive evidence and briefing from the parties to determine
which other health insurance reforms in the PPACA must fall with the mandate.
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